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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 332(c) of the Communications Act charges the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") with the duty to annually prepare a
report on the state of competition in the commercial mobile radio services
("CMRS") marketplace.I In June 2011, the FCC issued its Fifieenth Report on
the competitiveness of the CMRS market and the "mobile wireless
ecosystem." 2 Like its predecessors, the Fifteenth Report contains an abundance
of useful data points regarding the innovative and competitive dynamics of
today's wireless market. The FCC often relies upon this data, as well as its
own conclusions regarding that data, to determine "whether or not there is
effective competition" 3 in the wireless market. While most of the FCC's recent
reports answered that question in the affirmative, the Fifteenth Report offered
4
no answer.
Unfortunately, the Fifieenth Report suffers from two glaring analytical
shortcomings that are symptomatic of the FCC's pro-regulatory perspective
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' 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(C) (2006).
2 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, Fifteenth Report, 26 F.C.C.R.
9664, 2 (June 24, 2011) [hereinafter Fifteenth Report].
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4 See Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, TT 1-2.
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toward advanced communications services, including wireless. First, the
Report failed to fully satisfy Section 332(c)'s requirement that the FCC include
an analysis of whether the CMRS market is "effectively competitive" by
refusing to make any determination on that point.5 Second, the Report failed to
make a close examination of the potentialities of wireless substitution and the
dynamics of wireless-wireline intermodal competition.
This Article argues that today's wireless market is effectively competitive
and that wireless-wireline not only exists, but that it should be taken into
account in setting FCC wireless de-regulatory policy. It contends that the
Fifteenth Report's ambivalence about effective competition in the wireless
market and its lack of analysis of wireless substitution for wireline services is
shaped by the FCC's pro-regulatory perspective. More importantly, this Article
also warns that the Report's shortcomings regarding wireless marketplace
competition analysis will likely form the rationale for prolonging certain
outdated telecommunications regulation and imposing future regulations
regarding wireless services that are unwarranted by competitive market
conditions. Finally, in light of the FCC's pro-regulatory perspective, this
Article suggests that the agency's review of AT&T/T-Mobile might be
occasion for imposing new regulatory restrictions on wireless services that are
unwarranted in light of competitive conditions in the wireless market.
Section II provides a concise background of the FCC's statutory duties
regarding its preparation of the annual reports on the competitiveness of the
CMRS market, as well as an overview of their procedural and structural
aspects. Section III provides a snapshot of the data compiled in the FCC's
Fifteenth Report, highlighting the innovative and competitive nature of today's
wireless market. Section IV focuses on the two significant analytical
shortcomings of the Report; namely, the FCC's unwillingness to declare the
CMRS market "effectively competitive," and its failure to closely examine
intermodal competition between wireless and wireline services and incorporate
those competitive insights into its wireless regulatory policymaking. Finally,
Section V briefly considers the proposed AT&T/T-Mobile merger, analyzing
how the antitrust lawsuit by the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") might
impact the FCC's review of the merger and how the litigation might affect
FCC wireless policy. Drawing on insights and critical analysis of the FCC's
wireless competition reports, Section V also contains a brief critique of the
reasoning contained in DOJ's complaint.
5 Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. 1993 Act's Federal Regulatory Framework for Wireless
In the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Congress established a
federal regulatory framework for all commercial mobile services. Among its
key provisions regarding wireless, the 1993 Act mandated yearly FCC reports
on the state of competition in the commercial mobile services market.7
According to the 1993 Act:
The Commission shall review competitive market conditions with respect to
commercial mobile services and shall include in its annual report an analysis of those
conditions. Such analysis shall include an identification of the number of competitors
in various commercial mobile services, an analysis of whether or not there is effective
competition, an analysis of whether any of such competitors have a dominant share of
the market for such services, and a statement of whether additional providers or
classes of providers in those services would be likely to enhance competition.8
The legislation reaffirmed the FCC's principal regulatory authority over
wireless service and expressly preempted most state regulation of wireless
-9
service.
B. FCC's Wireless Competition Reports
1. FCC Wireless Competition Report Process
The FCC has released fifteen Wireless Competition Reports, beginning with
its First Report on CMRS competition in 1995.10 The FCC's Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau prepares the reports, which are then submitted for
a vote of approval and public release by the full Commission.n These reports
include data about CMRS services, as well as services and products in the
broader wireless marketplace. In its first six reports, the FCC "based its
analysis of competition in the CMRS industry solely on numerous publicly-
available sources of data on the industry."1 2 For its Seventh Report, the FCC
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, Title VI, §
6002(c), 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332).
Id. § 6002(c)(1)(C).
8Id.
9 See id. § 6002(c)(3)
10 See Fifieenth Report, supra note 2, at n.28 (citing all fourteen prior reports). All of the
FCC's CMRS reports are available at: http://commcns.org/rSW9Qu. The FCC did not
release reports in 1996 and 2007.
" Spectrum & Competition Policy Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, FCC
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://commcns.org/vxuzOH (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
1 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
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"held a Public Forum in February 2002 to examine ways in which to better
gather and analyze data" and "integrated into [the Seventh] report the data
submitted at the forum."'13
In December 2002, the FCC for the first time issued a notice of inquiry to
gather additional information in preparation for its Eighth Report.14 The
amount of information both relied on by the FCC in compiling its reports, and
transmitted by the FCC to the public through its publishing the reports, has
therefore increased over the years. The Twelfth Report, for instance, began
tracking wireless service coverage by census block. In many instances, new
sources of information contained in the reports have coincided with the gradual
addition of new sections, as will be discussed below with regard to report
structure. Those informational increases also correspond to continuous growth
in the size of the reports. Excluding appendices, the FCC's published version
of the Second Report is 61 pages in length, the Ninth Report is 94 pages, the
Twelfth Report is 124 pages, and the Fourteenth Report is 199 pages.
2. FCC Wireless Competition Report Structure: Basic Framework
The organizational structure of the FCC's wireless competition reports has
Commercial Mobile Services, Eighth Report, 18 F.C.C.R. 14783, 8 (June 26, 2003)
[hereinafter Eighth Report].
' In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Seventh Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 12985, 12988 (June 13, 2002)
[hereinafter Seventh Report].
14 The Eighth Report was the first to be assigned a Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
docket number. All subsequent reports have been prepared following the process initiated
with the Eighth Report. Compare In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market
Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Notice of Inquiry, 17 F.C.C.R.
24923 (Dec. 11, 2002) (issuing a Notice of Inquiry) with Seventh Report, supra note 13
(issuing a Report without a Notice of Inquiry).
Is See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, Twelfth Report, 23 F.C.C.R. 2241, 2245-46 (Jan. 28, 2008)
[hereinafter Twelfth Report].
16 See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, Second Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 11266 (Mar. 6, 1997)
[hereinafter Second Report]; In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market
Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Ninth Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 20597
(Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Ninth Report]; Twelfth Report, supra note 15; In re
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993;
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Mobile
Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, Fourteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407
(May 20, 2010) [hereinafter Fourteenth Report].
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also changed over time, reflecting to some degree the growth of new and
competing services in the wireless market. The FCC's earliest reports included
separate sections analyzing the state of competition for mobile telephony,
mobile data and messaging, traditional dispatch, and wireless data services,
respectively.17 Its Fifth Report merged the analysis of dispatch services into the
section on mobile telephony, in part due to "an increasing convergence of
services provided by dispatch and other mobile telephony providers." 18
Starting with its Ninth Report, the FCC "reorganized the presentation of the
various indicators to conform to a framework that groups such indicators into
four distinct categories."1 9 Each of those four categories corresponds to the
four statutory requirements set out in Section 332(c).20 The Fourteenth Report
re-labeled the four primary mobile wireless service sections as: Industry
Structure (Section III), Provider Conduct (Section IV), Performance (Section
V), and Consumer Behavior (Section VI).21 This basic four-fold framework
has been carried over to the most recent report.22
Following the four-fold framework, Section III "identifies the number of
competitors in various commercial mobile services, and it also uses subscriber
market shares to measure concentration in mobile telephone markets."23 A
"Horizontal Concentration" subsection includes a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) analysis of concentration in the nationwide facilities-based CMRS
market.24 The FCC first began calculating HHIs in 2003,25 and first included
26them in the Ninth Report. Additionally, a "Recent Entry and Exit" subsection
typically references mergers, divestitures, and other major transactions
involving wireless service providers.27 The FCC maintains that its reports "do[
" See, e.g., In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions
with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Fourth Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 10145 (June 10,
1999) [hereinafter Fourth Report].
18 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Sixth Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 13350, 13352-53 (June 20, 2001)
[hereinafter Sixth Report].
19 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Tenth Report, 20 F.C.C.R. 15908, 8 (Sept. 26, 2005)
[hereinafter Tenth Report].20 id
21 See Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, TT 20, 85, 153, 228.22 See Fifteenth Report, supra note 2.23 Tenth Report, supra note 19, 8.
24 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 18-19 (2010).25 See Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 1 5 1.26 See Ninth Report, supra note 16, 14.
27 See Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, if 67-79.
452011]1
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
]not address the merits of any license transfer applications that are currently
pending before the Commission or that may be filed in the future. .. "28
Section IV references carrier conduct, which typically includes data and
analysis regarding price rivalry in prepaid and postpaid services for mobile
voice as well as mobile data.29 It also covers non-price rivalry such as
technology deployment and upgrades, along with capital expenditures,
roaming, advertising, quality of service, mobile data services and apps, and
differentiation in handsets and other wireless devices. 30  The most recent
iterations of Section V detailing market performance have examined
subscribership numbers, geographical penetration rates, usage amounts, and
pricing dynamics.31 Additionally, this Section looks at carrier revenue,
investment, and profitability, as well as the overall impact of mobile wireless
services on the U.S. economy.32 Finally, consumer behavior is highlighted in
Section VI, which includes data and analysis of ability and cost for consumers
to switch wireless service or chum. 33 For instance, Section VI discusses issues
such as number portability, early termination fees (ETFs), and lock-in resulting
from handset exclusivity arrangements between carriers and manufacturers. 34
3. CMRS and Wireless Marketplace Competition Analysis
Most of the wireless competition reports contain the FCC's overall
assessment of CMRS marketplace competitiveness, either in the introduction
or in the section on market structure.35 The First Report concluded "although
the mobile telephone segment of CMRS was not fully competitive, entry by
additional CMRS providers was very likely to take place in the near future." 36
Similarly, the Second and Third Reports determined that "competition in the
mobile marketplace is emerging" and "the signs of competition are clear,"
respectively. 37 Moreover, the Fourth through Sixth Reports concluded there
was "increased competition" in the CMRS market,38 while the Seventh Report
28 See id I n.4 (citing Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, 6 n.14).
29 See id. 80, 83-84, 94.
30 See id 103.
' See id. 156.
32 See id 157.
33 See Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, % 239-66.
34 See id 240.
3 See e.g., discussion, infra notes 36-47.
36 See Second Report, supra note 16, at 11269.
3 Id.; In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, Third Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 19746, 19749 (May 14, 1998)
[hereinafter Third Report].
3 Fourth Report, supra note 17, at 10148-49; In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of
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determined that "the CMRS industry continued to experience increased
competition, innovation, lower prices for consumers, and increased diversity of
service offerings." 39
Beginning with the Eighth Report, however, the FCC expressly invoked
Section 332(c)(2)'s language with its conclusion that "there is effective
competition in the CMRS marketplace." 40 The next five reports similarly made
"effective competition" determinations as stated in those terms, and all five of
those reports reached the same conclusion that the CMRS market was
"effectively competitive." 41
Conversely, the FCC took a different approach to "effective competition"
determinations in its Fourteenth Report. The Report acknowledged that it
"does not contain a summary estimate of market power" that would identify
any kind of CMRS market failure,42 but was purported to "analyz[e]
competition across the entire mobile wireless ecosystem."43 This expanded
scope of analysis prevented the FCC from "reaching an overarching, industry-
wide determination with respect to whether there is 'effective competition,'
or what Chairman Julius Genachowski described as "an overly-simplistic yes-
or-no conclusion about the overall level of competition in this complex and
dynamic [wireless] ecosystem, comprised of multiple markets."45 Instead, the
Report asserted it would comply with Section 332(c)(2) by identifying "areas
where market conditions appear to be producing substantial consumer
benefits" and with "data that can form the basis for inquiries into whether
policy levers could produce superior outcomes." 46 The Fifteenth Report
followed this same approach regarding its analysis of wireless marketplace
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of
Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Fifth Report,
15 F.C.C.R. 17660, 17663-64 (Aug. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Fifth Report]; Sixth Report, supra
note 18, at 13353-54.
3 See Seventh Report, supra note 13, at 12988.
4 See Eighth Report, supra note 12, 12.
4 1 Ninth Report, supra note 16, 2, 225; Tenth Report, supra note 19, IT 2, 207; In re
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993;
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial
Mobile Services, Eleventh Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 10947, TT 2, 216 (Sept. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter Eleventh Report]; Twelfth Report, supra note 15, 1, 293; In re
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993;
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial
Mobile Services, Thirteenth Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185, 1, 277 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter
Thirteenth Report].
42 Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, 55.
43 Id 2.
4 Id 3.
45 Id at 11701 (Statement of Julius Genachowski, Chairman).
46 Id 3
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competitiveness, as will be discussed below.47
4. Additional Wireless Competition Report Sections
The Reports have also included additional sections supplementing the four
basic wireless services categories. In some cases, the FCC adds new sections to
the report covering topics that were more succinctly analyzed in smaller
subsections in prior reports. In other cases, the FCC merges certain sections
contained in prior reports into other sections for its newer reports. For
example, the Seventh and Eighth Reports contained subsections on satellite
mobile services.48 In addition, the Twelfth and Thirteenth Reports contained
separate sections on mobile satellite services ("MSS"),49 but data and analysis
regarding MSS was merged back into the other sections starting with the
Fourteenth Report.50
Moreover, while the FCC included data and analysis regarding wireless-
wireline competition as early as the Second Report,51 the Ninth Report was the
first to include a separate section on intermodal issues, including competition
between wireless and wireline. 52 The FCC also added three sections to its
Fourteenth Report to reflect its measurement of the entire ecosystem.5 3 In
addition to brief sections on "Urban-Rural Comparisons" 54 and "International
Comparisons,"55 the Report included a detailed section on "Input and
Downstream Segments of the Mobile Wireless Ecosystem."56 Included in the
input category were spectrum (covered separately in prior reports),
infrastructure (i.e. cell towers), and backhaul facilities, while the downstream
category encompassed wireless handsets and devices, mobile operating
47 See Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 7. See also discussion, infra Part IV.A.
48 Seventh Report, supra note 13, at 13026-28; Eighth Report, supra note 12, 189-91.
49 Twelfth Report, supra note 15, TT 259-88; Thirteenth Report, supra note 41, TT 240-73.
so Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, TT 36-38.
51 See, e.g., Second Report, supra note 16, at 11323-26; Third Report, supra note 37, at
19776-78; Fourth Report, supra note 17, at 10156-59; Seventh Report, supra note 13, at
13016; Eighth Report, supra note 12, 101-04.
52 Ninth Report, supra note 16, TT 211-21. The FCC continues to include an intermodal
competition section in its reports. See Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, TT 339-50;
Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, T 363-77.
5 See Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, IT 249-338, 351-67.
" See id TT 351-58. For examination of rural markets in prior reports, see, e.g., Tenth
Refort, supra note 19, 93.
See Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, TT 359-67. For international comparisons
contained in prior reports, see, e.g., Tenth Report, supra note 19, T$ 50-54; Ninth Report,
supra note 16, 58-61; Eighth Report, supra note 12, TT 192-96; Seventh Report, supra
note 13, at 13028-37.
56 Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, 249-338.
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systems, applications, and mobile commerce.57
III. FCC'S FIFTEENTH REPORT ON WIRELESS COMPETITION
The best executive summary of data contained in the Fifteenth Report is the
one provided in the Report itself. What follows is a shorter highlight of
information provided by the Report, the purpose of which is to offer a snapshot
look at the current state of competition in the wireless marketplace.
On June 27, the FCC released the Fifteenth Report, which focused on
"conditions prevailing in the mobile wireless industry during 2009 and much
of 2010.,,59 Excluding appendices, the FCC's published version of the Report
runs 227 pages in length.6o Like its immediate predecessor, the Fifteenth
Report describes its scope as "the wireless ecosystem," comprising everything
from wireless carriers to prepaid calling services, mobile app stores,
smartphone devices, and cell towers.61 The body of the Report packs in plenty
of positive data when it comes to wireless marketplace innovation, investment,
competition, as well as choice of service and price options.62 Data compiled in
the Report describes how consumers continue to enjoy an increasing number of
innovative wireless products, with a myriad of services and price options
available.63
According to a 2010 estimate contained in the Report concerning voice
service coverage, 99.2% of the population is served by two or more wireless
voice providers; 97.2% is served by three or more providers; and 94.3% is
served by four or more providers. Numbers for wireless broadband coverage
and competition also stack up well. An estimate in the Report indicates that
two or more wireless broadband service providers serve 91.9% of the
population; 81.7% is served by three or more providers; and 67.8% is served
by four or more providers.6 5
The wireless market is characterized by heavy investment, especially in light
of overall economic conditions. Although the Report acknowledges some
declines in wireless capital expenditures in recent years, with expenditures
varying by wireless operator,66 it nonetheless concludes that "[o]ver the past
" See id. 249, 299.
5 See Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, f 1-2.59 d 17.
60 id,
61 Id 1-2.
62 See generally id.
63 See generally id.
6 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 1 45 tbl.5.65 Id. T 46 tbl.7.66 Id. 210-11 chart 29.
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decade, mobile wireless service providers have invested significantly in
wireless network structures and equipment." 67 The Report cites from an
industry report that "capital investment increased slightly from $20.2 billion in
2008 to $20.4 billion in 2009,",68 and a "Census Bureau estimate of wireless
industry capital expenditures in 2009 was similar at $20.65 billion." 69
Heavy capital expenditures are primarily directed to coverage expansion and
network upgrades that both embody innovation and provide a platform that
enables other wireless innovation. The Report points out, for instance, that 3G
and 4G network build-out by wireless carriers continues.70 With regard to
deployment of 4G technologies LTE and WiMax, as of December 2010,
Verizon Wireless is reported to have "launched LTE in 38 cities covering 110
million people" and expects to "expand LTE to its entire EV-DO footprint
(289 million people) by the end of 2013."71 AT&T Wireless plans to launch
LTE "in areas covering around 75 million people by mid-2011 and to complete
its LTE buildout by year-end 2013."72 Sprint Nextel resells Clearwire's
WiMax service, which as of the end of 2010 "covered approximately 120
million people." 73 While T-Mobile is described as having "[n]o U.S.-specific
plans,"74 MetroPCS "launched LTE in 13 cities" as of January 2011.75
As the Report states, "[d]uring 2009 and much of 2010, service providers
and device manufacturers launched several new devices - including
smartphones, tablets, wireless modem cards, and mobile Wi-Fi hotspots - that
enable consumers to use data services more quickly and easily while
mobile."76 Many of these devices run on operating systems that are themselves
the source of intense competition, with RIM, Google, and Apple leading the
market. 77 In terms of market share, as of August 2010, RIM's operating system
had a 37.6% share of smartphones in use, Apple had a 24.2% share, and
Microsoft had a 10.8% share.78 But numbers for all three companies were
down from December 2009.79 By contrast, Google rose from only a 5.2% share
67 Id. 207.
6' Id. 2.
69 id
70 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, at 9671 (explaining 3G and 4G deployment by selected
mobile wireless service providers).
71 Id. (3G/4G Deployment by Selected Mobile Wireless Service Providers Table).
72 Id. (3G/4G Deployment by Selected Mobile Wireless Service Providers Table).
7 Id. (3G/4G Deployment by Selected Mobile Wireless Service Providers Table).
74 Id (3G/4G Deployment by Selected Mobile Wireless Service Providers Table).
7 Id. (3G/4G Deployment by Selected Mobile Wireless Service Providers Table).
76 Fifieenth Report, supra note 2, at 9682.
n Id. at 9683.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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of smartphones in use in December 2009 to a 19.6% share in August 2010.80
Wireless innovation is also characterized by an exploding market in mobile
applications. According to the Report, the number of applications downloaded
from Apple's App Store rose from 100,000 in 2008 to over 6.5 billion by
September 2010, while the Android Market has surpassed one billion total
downloads. 8 Additionally, "social networking ranked as the fastest-growing
mobile content category between April 2009 and April 2010, with the number
of mobile consumers using an application to access a social networking
website increasing 240 percent to 14.5 million users." 82
As consumer behavior continues to evolve, adoption of mobile data services
increases. Based on Numbering Report/Utilization Forecast ("NRUF") data,
"the number of mobile wireless connections grew four percent from 279.6
million at the end of 2008 to 290.7 million at the end of 2009.",83 Moreover, the
Report notes that "as of May 2010, an estimated 40 percent of American adults
used their cell phone to go online," up eight percentage points from April 2009
and sixteen percentage points from December 2007.84 Interestingly, however,
average monthly usage declined, while text and multimedia messaging
increased.8 5 As of December 2009, the average voice minutes of use ("MOU")
per subscriber per month was down to 696 from a peak of 769 MOUs per
subscriber per month in December 2007.86 For the sixth month period ending
December 2009, the average text messages per user per month was 488, up
from 388 during that same period one year earlier and up from 50 for the sixth
month period ending December 2005.87
The number of wireless-only consumers is also on the rise. The Report cites
a National Health Interview Survey indicating that a growing number of
households - approximately 26.6% - are now wireless-only."8 Additionally, it
points out that "[a] Nielsen Company survey shows a similar rising trend in
households who have 'cut the cord."' 89 Playing an important role in this shift,
however, is the general downward trend in prices for wireless services. The
Report notes the decline in average revenue per voice minute, which has
decreased from $0.112 per minute in 2002 to $0.049 per minute in 2009.90 It
80 Id.
81 Id. at 9684 (Apple App Store - Available Apps and App Downloads Table).82 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, at 9684.
Id. at 9671.
84 Id. 164.
85 Id at 9675 (Average Voice MOUs Per Subscriber Per Month and Average Text and
MMS Per Subscriber Per Month Tables).
86 Id. (Average Voice MOUs Per Subscriber Per Month Table).
87 Id. (Average Text and MMS Messages Per Subscriber Per Month Table).
88 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 365.
89 Id.
98 Id. 1 191 tbl.20.
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also cites estimates that "the unit price for text messages continued to fall in
2009" as "price per text yields dropped for the fifth consecutive year in 2009 to
$0.009, a 25 percent decline from the previous year." 91 Finally, the Report
identified one analyst's estimate that "as of mid-2010, typical price-per-MB for
unlimited data plans on smartphones ranged from $0.02 to $0.15 and the
typical price-per-MB for data plans for laptops and wireless data cards ranged
from $0.01 to $0.08.",92
Regarding market concentration, "the weighted average of HHIs (weighted
by population across the 172 economic areas in the United States) was 2811 at
the end of 2009, compared to 2842 at the end of 2008."93 The Report observes
that "[a]s of mid-2010, the weighted average of HHIs increased to 2848,
slightly higher than the year-end 2008 level." 94 However, it also notes that
Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimated the U.S. mobile market
concentration at an HHI of 2350.95
As far as spectrum holdings, the Report explained that AT&T and Verizon
hold "[m]ost of the spectrum below I GHz suitable for the provision of mobile
broadband." 96 Specifically, "Verizon Wireless holds 45 percent of the MHz-
POPs of Cellular and 700 MHz spectrum combined, while AT&T holds
approximately 33 percent." 97 Furthermore, "Sprint Nextel and Clearwire
combined hold 47 percent of the MHz-POPs of the above-1 GHz spectrum
bands (PCS, AWS, BRS, and EBS)." 98
In terms of international comparisons, the Report observes that "[t]he
average monthly subscriber bill (ARPU) in the United States, at $49.91, is
much higher than the Western European average of $35.09."99 This difference
can be explained in part by estimates that "U.S. mobile subscribers talked an
average of 824 minutes per month on their mobile phones in the fourth quarter
of 2009," compared with "137 MOUs in Japan and an average across Western
Europe of 160 MOUs." 100 Significantly, revenue per minute (RPM) for voice
"in Western Europe averaged about $0.16 in the fourth quarter of 2009,"
oi Id. 193.
92 Id. at 9676.
9 Id. at 9679.
94 Ffteenth Report, supra note 2, at 9679 (explaining that "[a]ntitrust authorities in the
United States generally classify markets into three types: Unconcentrated (HI < 1500),
Moderately Concentrated (1500 < HHI <2500), and Highly Concentrated (HHI > 2500).").
95 Id T 395.
9 Id at 9682.
9 Id. ("'MHz-POPs' refers to the amount of spectrum in a given license or set of
frequencies multiplied by the population covered by the geographic area of the spectrum
license.").
" Id. at 9682 n. 19.
9 Id. 390.
100 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 392.
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compared with "an estimated U.S. RPM of $0.04, a quarter of the European
average."' 0 1
Comparing mobile market concentration internationally, the Report noted
Bank of America Merrill Lynch's finding that "the United Kingdom had the
least concentrated mobile market at the end of 2009, with an estimated HHI of
2220." 102 The U.S. mobile market had the second lowest level with an HHI of
2350, but would have held onto the second position even if the FCC
substituted its own, higher estimate.103 Additionally "[a]mong countries of
comparable income levels in Western Europe and the Asia Pacific region,
those with the highest levels of mobile market concentration at the end of 2009
were Switzerland, where the HHI was 4580, and New Zealand, at 4620."l04
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE FCC'S FIFTEENTH COMPETITION REPORT
This Article suggests that two serious shortcomings are manifest in the
FCC's Fifteenth Report. First, the Report's refusal to make a determination as
to whether or not the CMRS market is effectively competitive is contrary to the
statute, and makes little sense given all the evidence that points to an
effectively competitive market. Agencies have an obligation to fulfill their
statutory obligations, even when they are difficult. There is reason to believe
that the lack of effective competition finding lays the groundwork for
continuing existing regulation and perhaps even the imposition of new
regulations otherwise inappropriate or more difficult to justify in a competitive
market.
Second, the Report's intermodal competition analysis is too cursory and
fails to take seriously the reality of such competition in today's advanced
telecommunications marketplace. There is prima facie evidence of intermodal
competition, which even the FCC itself has recognized. Furthermore, where
intermodal competition exists, deregulation should follow. Unfortunately, the
FCC has not internalized this information, but instead has taken a pro-
regulatory perspective and thrown up roadblocks that preserve the outdated
status quo. In its next competition report, the FCC should undertake more
serious analysis and let that guide its regulatory policies regarding wireless and
wireline.
101 Id 391.
102 Id 395.
103 Id
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A. FCC Fails to Fulfill its "Effective Competition" Analysis Obligations
The FCC's refusal to make any determination in the Fifteenth Report as to
whether or not the CMRS market is effectively competitive is contrary to the
agency's statutory mandate. Section 332(c)(1)(C) provides that the FCC's
annual report "shall include . . . an analysis of whether or not there is effective
competition" in the CMRS market. 0 5 By its terms, Congress mandated the
FCC do more than merely provide an analysis of competitive conditions in the
market. In particular, the provision's pointedness in directing the FCC to
analyze "whether or not" effective competition exists suggests a yes-or-no
conclusory component to the Congressional requirement. 106
To read Section 332(c)(1)(C) as requiring only an analysis and not any
accompanying conclusion means interpreting the words of the statute in an
unnatural and wooden sense. In its everyday, ordinary meaning, a command to
analyze whether or not certain conditions exist or whether or not a certain
standard is satisfied suggests that the required analysis include at least a
tentative conclusion or recommendation based upon that analysis. Like any
other statute, Section 332(c)(1)(C) should be understood in its ordinary sense.
Thus, the best commonsense reading of Section 332(c)(1)(C) calls for an
overall determination by the FCC in its annual report of whether or not there is
effective competition in the wireless market.
The FCC's rationales for refusing to determine whether or not there is
effective competition in the CMRS market also are unconvincing. The FCC
grouped video, voice, and data services into the more general category of
"mobile wireless services" in the Report and placed those services in "the
middle part of the mobile wireless ecosystem."10 7 Further, the FCC asserts that
the Report "complies with the statutory requirements for analyzing competitive
market conditions with respect to commercial mobile services by employing an
analysis founded upon an expanded view of the mobile wireless services
marketplace and an examination of competition across the entire mobile
wireless ecosystem."
08
However, the agency subsequently noted that the complexity of the mobile
wireless ecosystem made is difficult "to make a single, all-inclusive finding
regarding effective competition that adequately encompasses the level of
competition in the various interrelated segments, types of services, and vast
geographic areas of the mobile wireless industry." 109 As a result, the FCC
05 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(C) (2006).
106 id.
107 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 7.
,o Id. 13.
109 Id. 14.
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"refrain[ed] from providing any single conclusion because such an assessment
would be incomplete and possibly misleading in light of the variations and
complexities . . . .". Thus, the Commission recast its statutorily mandated
analysis of whether or not there is effective competition in the CMRS market
as an analysis of competitive conditions across the entire wireless ecosystem.
The FCC also insisted that the concept of "effective competition" was
equally meaningless, at least for the agency's purposes. The Report noted the
lack of a "definition of 'effective competition' widely accepted by economists
or competition policy authorities such as the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ")."' " Moreover, it quoted a DOJ ex parte filing explaining that "[t]he
operative question in competition policy is whether there are policy levers that
can be used to produce superior outcomes, not whether the market resembles
the textbook model of perfect competition."ll 2 According to the FCC, the
DOJ's position is "in agreement with the approach taken in this Report."" 3 In
short, the FCC seems to have interpreted (or reinterpreted) Section
332(c)(1)(C) as a mandate to prepare an analysis of the wireless ecosystem and
determine whether policy levers will produce better competitive outcomes.
In this respect, the Fifieenth Report repeated the approach that the FCC took
in its prior report. In the Fourteenth Report, the FCC declined to make any
declaration as to whether there was effective competition in the CMRS market,
stating that its purpose was to identify "areas where it would be fruitful to
inquire whether policy levers could produce superior outcomes."I 14 As
Commissioner Robert McDowell wrote in his dissenting statement, "this point
in particular is outside the scope of our statutory mandate to produce the
report."" 5 Similarly, the Fifieenth Report's repetition of this revisionist
approach strays from the agency's statutory mandate.
By its own description, the FCC's latest interpretation of Section
332(c)(1)(C) appears conceptually confusing. While maintaining there is no
accepted definition of "effective competition" and that its focus is on
ostensible policymaking outcomes, the FCC nonetheless claims that it provides
such an analysis of whether there is effective mobile wireless competition. It is
unclear how the FCC is able to analyze whether or not there is "effective
competition" when it claims to not know what "effective competition" means.
Moreover, linking its recent non-conclusions about effective competition in the
CMRS market with its earliest reports is neither persuasive nor helpful. The
noId. f 15.
Id.
112 Id.
13 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 15.
114 Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, $ 3.
115 Id. at 11704 (McDowell, Comm'r, concurring).
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FCC maintained that its approach is consistent with the agency's first seven
reports "which did not reach an overall conclusion regarding whether or not
the CMRS marketplace was effectively competitive, but provided an analysis
and description of the CMRS industry's competitive metrics and trends."116
It goes without saying that an agency's disregard of its regulatory duty on
one or more prior occasions does not provide precedent justifying future
departures from agency obligations. The FCC's failure to provide wireless
competition reports in 1996 and 2007 should offer no excuse for the agency to
issue no report in 2012. Additionally, a reading of the statute as outlined earlier
suggests the FCC would have better fulfilled its duties under Section
332(c)(1)(C) by including a clear determination of whether or not the CMRS
market was effectively competitive, beginning with its First Report. For the
same reason, the FCC's reports that include effective competition
determinations offer the better approach to satisfying Section 332(c)(1)(C).
Arguably, where an agency has gained experience in carrying out its specific
statutory duties, reasonable expectations should be raised with regards to the
agency's present and future performance of those same duties. Particularly
where the subject for study and analysis is multi-faceted and rapidly changing,
keeping up with the currents and covering all bases in its analysis may be
especially challenging when working from the ground up. With repetition,
however, an agency can tap its storehouse of accumulated knowledge and
experience. It can compare its recent undertakings against the terms of its
statutory mandate and thereby gain improved understanding of its duties. In its
First Report, the FCC declared its goal to have its future reports "build on" its
initial effort, recognizing that "[r]eports in future years may be able to reach
more definitive conclusions about markets and degrees of competition, both
within CMRS and between CMRS and other services."117
By including neither a declaration nor any discussion of "effective
competition" in the CMRS market, the FCC's first seven reports hardly
amount to a close reading and vigorous implementation of Section
332(c)(1)(C). To the credit of the early and mid-1990s FCC, however, its
earliest reports did express some sentiments regarding competition in the
CMRS markets. The FCC also expanded both its sources of information and
the scope of its analysis of the growing CMRS and wireless market in
successive iterations of its report. That the Eighth through Thirteenth Reports
116 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 15.
117 In re Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, First Report, 10 F.C.C.R. 8844, 69 (July 28, 1995)
[hereinafter First Report].
118 See discussion, infra Part II.B.
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make "effective competition" declarations suggests that repetition bred further
improvements by the FCC in its understanding of statutory responsibilities and
in the correspondence between those responsibilities and its published reports.
The inclusion of "effective competition" declarations fits with an overall
pattern of incremental advancement in FCC reports.
But if the FCC considered the CMRS market pre-competitive but potentially
highly competitive in its earliest days, then increasingly competitive, and
subsequently "effectively competitive," the FCC now seems to suggest the
CMRS market has somehow turned post-competitive. Rather than mark a
return to earlier and more reliable precedent, the FCC's treatment of "effective
competition" declarations as useless and something to be avoided in its
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Reports suggests a kind of backsliding when it comes
to the issue of effective competition.
These considerations regarding the Congressional requirements set out in
Section 332(c)(1)(C) point to an important principle: agencies have an
obligation to fulfill their statutory obligations, even when they are difficult.
The FCC insists in the Fifteenth Report, "[i]t would be overly simplistic to
apply a binary conclusion or blanket label to this complex and multi-
dimensional industry" and "such an assessment would be incomplete and
possibly misleading in light of the variations and complexities we observe." 1 9
But as Commissioner Robert McDowell responded in his concurring
statement, "[n]onetheless, this is what Congress asked us to do."l 20 It is not
unheard of for Congress to delegate difficult decision-making duties to
administrative agencies. Just because an agency believes it's saddled with a
difficult duty doesn't mean the agency is absolved from its responsibility to
carry out that duty. Where circumstances render agency decision-making
difficult but not impossible, the agency has an implied obligation to undertake
reasonable, extra effort to carry out its responsibilities.
However, in considering the existence of "effective competition," the FCC
was not faced with a difficult a mission. Even assuming the FCC's
characterization of its delegated duty as "overly simplistic," the agency could
still, for instance, supplement a "binary conclusion" about the wireless market
with an explanation of the conclusion's limitations.121 The FCC could extend
its analysis to various segments of the wireless market and, based on the
available data, also opine on whether particular segments are more or less
competitive with a series of secondary conclusions. In so doing the FCC could
provide a fuller picture of the wireless market that exceeds the "blanket label"
that the FCC eschewed in the Fifteenth Report.
" Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, TT 14-15.120 Id. at 9969 (McDowell, Comm'r, concurring).
12 Id. f 14.
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Rather than avoid making a conclusion by contending that there is no single,
settled definition of "effective competition," the FCC could instead offer its
own definition. Alternatively, it could offer two or three plausible definitions,
measure the state of the CMRS market according to each respective standard,
and make its best overall decision as to whether or not the CMRS market is
effectively competitive on that basis. In fact, the FCC previously has taken
such an approach. For example, the FCC has established and applied an agency
definition of "effective competition" in the context of cable and other multi-
video programming distributor ("MVPD") services. Under Section
623(l)(1)(B), the FCC grants relief to incumbent cable operators from rate
regulations when the petitioning cable operator presents evidence that effective
competition is present within its particular franchise area.122 The FCC applies a
"competing provider test," whereby the franchise area is deemed effectively
competitive if it is served by at least two unaffiliated MVPDs offering
comparable video services to half of the households and the number of
households subscribing to services other than that of the largest MVPD
exceeds fifteen percent. 123
The FCC could apply a standard similar to the one it uses for Section
623(l)(1)(B) to the CMRS market in order to gain some perspective as to
whether the CMRS market is effectively competitive. For example, it could
offer a nationwide percentage of the population covered by multiple CMRS
providers. Under this metric, the CMRS market performs exceedingly well; as
the Fifteenth Report notes, 99.2% of the U.S. population is served by two or
more wireless voice providers, 97.2% is served by three or more providers, and
94.3% are served by four or more providers.124 Furthermore, two or more
wireless broadband service providers serve 91.9% of the population; 81.7% is
served by three or more providers; and 67.8% is served by four or more
providers.' 25
The FCC in fact has taken a similar approach to Section 623(l)(1)(B) in
prior reports. For example, the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Reports pointed to
the percentage of the total U.S. population living in counties with access to
multiple providers as one indicator of "effective competition" in the CMRS
market.126 Additionally, the Tenth and Eleventh Reports pointed to the absence
of any one provider having a dominant share of the market.127 Despite this,
122 See 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2)-(5) (2006).
123 See id. §543(l)(1)(B). 47 C.F.R. § 76.905(b)(2) (2010).
124 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, at 9669 (Estimated Mobile Wireless Voice Coverage
by Census Block, 2010 Table).
125 Id. (Estimated Mobile Wireless Voice Coverage by Census Block, 2010 Table).
26 Ninth Report, supra note 16, 1 2; Tenth Report, supra note 19, 1 2; Eleventh Report,
supra note 41, 2.127 See Tenth Report, supra note 19, $ 2; Eleventh Report, supra note 41, 2.
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snapshots of market share should not be the end-all, be-all of any competition
analysis. Dynamic markets are characterized by rapid innovation, including
technological convergence and cross-platform competition, as well as potential
or future competition, whereas mere market share offers only static look at
markets.
To its credit, the Commission acknowledges that HHI measures of industry
concentration do not by themselves dictate whether or not a market is
competitive.128 It also admits that its own HHI calculations do not take into
account the competitive effects of the resale market that has attracted growing
numbers of customers to prepaid wireless services. 129 Unfortunately, at least
one FCC Commissioner has bemoaned what he perceives to be a concentrated
industry' 30 and the agency's record in considering potential competition has
been decidedly mixed in other areas.' 31 A better assessment of competition
should consider not the particular technology used to deliver the service, but
the service itself, regardless of platform. However, as discussed below, the
FCC has been hesitant to actively consider intermodal competition between
wireless and wireline.
Leaving aside FCC analytical frameworks and formal definitions, suppose
one takes "effective competition" in a simple and everyday sense to mean that
the market offers consumers a variety of service and price options from
competing providers. If so, given all the evidence contained in the Fifteenth
Report pointing to innovation and competition in wireless services and prices,
there is strong reason to conclude the CMRS market is effectively competitive.
As noted, consumers enjoy price and service options from multiple national,
regional, and local CMRS providers. The wireless industry also remains the
128 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 54:
Shares of subscribers and measures of concentration are not synonymous with a
non-competitive market or with market power - the ability to charge prices above
the competitive level for a sustained period of time. High market concentration
may indicate that a firm or firms potentially may be able to exercise market
power, but market concentration measures alone are insufficient to draw such a
conclusion.. .[O]ther factors that may influence the state of competition in the
mobile wireless services market... include entry and exit conditions, the degree of
price and non-price rivalry, innovation, and the influence of the upstream and
downstream markets.
129 Id 34-36.130 Id at 9968 (Copps, Comm'r, concurring).
See, e.g., Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 294, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that
the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the "Verizon 6" forbearance petition
by departing from precedent without adequate explanation in applying a per se market share
test that considered only actual, and not potential, competition in the market place). See also
Randolph J. May, Assessing the FCC's Competition-Assessing Competence, THE FREE
STATE FOUND., at 3 (June 24, 2009) (critiquing the FCC's disregard of potential competition
in its policymaking, particularly with regards to the special access market).
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subject of strong financial investment, with 2009 CapEx at over $20 billion.132
Much of that investment has been poured into network upgrades, with
expanding 3G coverage and early 4G deployments enabling a variety of
innovative new wireless products and services, such as smartphones, tablets, e-
readers, and wireless modem cards.133 Moreover, consumers are increasingly
adopting mobile data services such as e-mail, wireless Internet access, instant
messaging, and text messaging.134
From an everyday, commonsense perspective, these numbers describe a
wireless ecosystem and a CMRS market that is "effectively competitive."
Significantly, the Report does not point to any kind of market failure that
otherwise would upset such a commonsense view of the market's
competitiveness. There also is a strongly counterintuitive aspect to the Report's
non-conclusions about the CMRS market's competitiveness. Dynamism and
increasing complexity are signs of an innovative and competitive market.
However, the FCC makes a liability out of an asset by treating wireless
dynamism and increasing complexity as triggers for future wireless regulation.
The FCC's apparent ambivalence in the face of the data cited in the
Fifteenth Report owes to the agency's pro-regulatory perspective. Recall the
FCC's characterization of its analytical emphasis in the Fifteenth Report:
"[t]he operative question in competition policy is whether there are policy
levers that can be used to produce superior outcomes."135 When the FCC first
expressed its "policy lever" approach in the Fourteenth Report, Commissioner
Robert McDowell stated that the FCC "appears to lay the foundation for more
regulation."136 Indeed, the FCC's non-conclusions about the competitiveness
of the CMRS market better enable a pro-regulatory or policy lever approach to
wireless.
The presence of effective market competition provides the primary
justification for deregulation, not new regulation. Where market forces are at
work, wireless provider behavior is constrained by the competitive threat of
rivals and potential rivals, increasing incentives for providers to better meet
consumer demands and curb anticompetitive conduct. In an effectively
competitive market, the conditions most conducive to continuing old
regulation and imposing new regulation are absent, rendering regulation
increasingly suspect and difficult to justify. The lack of an effective
competition finding provides the FCC with a convenient source of authority
132 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 208.
'3 Id. 207-11.
134 Anna Johnson, U.S. Consumers Embrace Mobile Internet and Email Services,
KIKABINK NEWS (Dec. 8, 2009), http://commcns.org/t4C2nN.
135 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 15.
36 Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, at 11704 (McDowell, Comm'r, concurring).
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and rationale for continuing existing regulation and perhaps imposing new
regulation otherwise inappropriate in a competitive market. Moreover, courts
are more likely to subject regulation to less exacting scrutiny, giving greater
deference to agency regulatory intervention in the absence of any recognition
of robust market competition.
Over the last few years, Congress and the Commission have proposed or
considered wireless-related restrictions and mandates that include: next
generation wireless disclosure regulation;'37  ETF regulation;' 38  handset
exclusivity regulation;139 bill shock regulation;140 text messaging and common
short code regulation;141 smartphone app and design regulation;142 cell phone
shutdown regulation;143 and voice mail password regulation.' 4 Moreover, the
FCC has recently instituted "open access" requirements for 700 MHz C block
spectrum license usage,145 net neutrality regulations,146 and data roaming
137 Next Generation Wireless Disclosure Act, H.R. 2281, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
138 Cell Phone Early Termination Fee, Transparency, and Fairness Act, S. 2825, 11Ith
Con. (2009).
1 Cecilia Kang, FCC to Scrutinize Exclusive Wireless Contracts, WASH. POST (June 19,
2009), http://commcns.org/vEccsm; Phil Goldstein, FCC Will Investigate Handset
Exclusivity Deals, FIERCEWIRELESS.COM, (June 19, 2009), http://commcns.org/tmDKyh.
140 In re Empowering Consumers to Avoid Bill Shock; Consumer Information and
Disclosure, Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.R. 14625 (Oct. 14, 2010). In response
to this action, CTIA joined with the FCC and Consumers Union to announce the "Wireless
Consumer Usage Notification Guidelines," as an addition to CTIA's "Consumer Code for
Wireless Service." These new guidelines compel wireless providers to send free alerts to
subscribers in order to help them manage usage and avoid unexpected overage charges for
data, voice, messaging and international roaming. See CTIA, FCC, and Consumers Unions
Announce Free Alerts to Help Consumers Avoid Unexpected Overage Charges, CTIA -THE
WIRELESS ASS'N BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011), http://commcns.org/vfOcNL.
141 In re Petition of Public Knowledge et al. for Declaratory Ruling Stating that Text
Messaging and Short Codes Are Title 11 Services or Are Title I Services Subject to Section
202 Nondiscrimination Rules, Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Public Knowledge, Free
Press, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Educause, Media Access
Pro ect, New America Foundation, US PIRG, WT Docket No. 08-7 (Dec. 11, 2007).
I4I See, e.g., Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011, S. 1223, 112th Cong. §3(b) (2011)
(regulating smart phone applications that use GPS tracking features); Performance Rights
Act, H.R. 848 and S.379, 111th Cong. (2010). NAB initially sought an amendment to the
Performance Rights Act that would include imposing an FM chipset mandate on wireless
manufacturers. Later, however, it indicated that it opposed a mandate and instead supported
voluntary activation of radio chips. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, NAB
Statement Regarding CTIA Blog Post on Radio Enabled Devices (Sept. 12, 2011).
143 Brendan Sasso, Schumer Urges Wireless Providers to Disable Stolen Phones, THE
HILL (Aug. 22, 2011), http://commcns.org/rKMsdL.
14 Gautham Nagesh, Senator Boxer Urges Sprint, T-Mobile to Beef Up Voicemail
Security, THE HILL (Sept. 1, 2011), http://commcns.org/uwHcLD.
145 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762, and 777-792 MHz Bands; Revision of
the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling
Systems; Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible
Telephones; Biennial Regulatory Review - Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and 90 to
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regulations,147 of which the latter two will likely require able analytical
defenses to withstand court challenges. Many, or perhaps most, of these
regulatory proposals and regulations are justified in the context of
anticompetitive conduct or generally uncompetitive market conditions. But in
a market declared to be effectively competitive by the FCC, the justifiability of
many such regulatory proposals becomes far less plausible.
Thus, the FCC's agnosticism toward the existence of an effectively
competitive wireless market gives existing regulation a better chance of being
continued and proposals for new wireless regulation a better chance of being
implemented. At minimum, the effective competition non-conclusions in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Reports keeps the FCC's regulatory options open and
makes any future regulatory initiatives more administratively feasible. The
agency's current modus operandi appears to be book-ending a plethora of
positive data points regarding wireless innovation and competition with non-
conclusions about the state of CMRS competition that double as a pretext for
future wireless regulations.
B. FCC's Disinterest in Intermodal Competition and Cord Cutting
While the FCC's competition reports have expanded to account for the
changing landscape of the wireless ecosystem, the most recent reports fail to
adequately consider the impact of intermodal or cross-platform competition
with regards to wireless services. While the FCC claims that its Fifteenth
Report "regularly assess[es] whether services provided using other
technologies, such as wireline, fixed wireless, and satellites, can or will place
competitive pressure on mobile wireless service providers," its assessment of
intermodal competition is only cursory and suggests no meaningful
implications for FCC regulatory policy regarding such competing services. 148
The FCC acknowledges in the Fifieenth Report that "[t]he number of adults
Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services; Former
Nextel Communications, Inc. Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part
27 of the Commission's Rules; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable
Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Development of Operational, Technical and
Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety
Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010; Declaratory Ruling on Reporting
Requirement under Commission's Part I Anti-Collusion Rule, Second Report and Order, 22
F.C.C.R. 15289, 205 (July 31, 2007); 47 C.F.R. § 27.16 (2010).
146 See In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Report and
Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905, if 93-106 (Dec. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Open Internet Order].
147 See In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio
Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Second Report and Order,
26 F.C.C.R. 5411 (Apr. 7, 2011). See also 47 C.F.R. § 20.12-.13 (2009).148 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 1 8.
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who rely exclusively on mobile wireless for voice service has increased
significantly in recent years."l 49 Based on data gathered and made publicly
available, there is strong prima facie evidence of intermodal competition
between wireless and wireline. The Report cites a National Health Interview
survey indicating that a growing number of households - approximately 26.6%
- are now wireless-only. 50 This number is up from prior iterations of the NIH
survey, which indicated that only 12.8% of household were wireless-only in
the second half of 2006.1"
There also are clear indicators that this wireless-only trend will continue to
grow, due to the fact that wireless-only usage is even stronger among younger
consumers than the general adult population. As the NIH survey notes, "[fjor
adults aged 25-29, more than half (51.3 percent) lived in households with
wireless-only telephones . . . the first time that wireless-only households have
exceeded landline households in any of the age ranges examined." 52
Moreover, a survey by the Nielsen Company noted a similar trend dealing with
households who have 'cut the cord."" 5 3 Specifically, it found that 21% of
households reported being wireless-only in 2009, a rise of six percentage
points from two years earlier.154 This increase was attributed to "the two-thirds
of households who have dropped their landlines as well as from young adults
who started new households with just a wireless phone service."155
This information is consistent with data that the FCC has released regarding
the increasing numbers of wireless subscribers and decreasing numbers of
switched access lines. Its recent Local Telephone Competition Report stated
that as of the end of June 2010, the number of wireless voice subscribers
nationwide had increased to almost 279 million - up almost 14 million from a
year before and more than 61 million from four years prior.'5 6 In contrast, the
149 Id 363.
"so Id 365 n.1062 (citing STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG AND JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT'L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY
RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY - JUNE
2010 (2010)).
151 Id. (citing STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG AND JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF
ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY - JUNE 2010
(2010)).
152 Id. 364.
1 Id 365 n. 1066 (citing Study: More Cellular-only Homes as Americans Expand
Mobile Media Usage, NIELSEN WIRE, (Dec. 21, 2009), http://commcns.org/v920pJ).
154 Id. (citing Study: More Cellular-only Homes as Americans Expand Mobile Media
Usage, NIELSEN WIRE, (Dec. 21, 2009), http://commcns.org/v920pJ).
Id. (citing Study: More Cellular-only Homes as Americans Expand Mobile Media
Usa e, NIELSEN WIRE, (Dec. 21, 2009), http://commcns.org/v920pJ).
FCC, INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, LOCAL
TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2010, at 28 (2011).
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Report indicated that the number of switched access lines for both ILECs and
non-ILEC telecommunications providers totals approximately 122 million,
down from approximately 133 million the year before and down from over 172
million from June 2006.157
If the Fifteenth Report is any indication, however, the FCC has little interest
in intermodal competition and even less interest in how that competition
should shape its regulatory policy. The FCC all but dismissed the competitive
impact and potential of wireless substitutability, even in light of the numbers it
cited regarding the growing numbers of wireless-only and cutting the cord
households. In fact, the Report stated, "it is still not yet clear whether mobile
wireless Internet access services can substitute completely for fixed wireline
Internet access technologies." 15 Furthermore, the Commission noted that
"[t]he extent to which mobile wireless services can impose some competitive
discipline . . . will depend on how technology, costs, and consumer preferences
evolve, and on the business strategies of providers that offer both wireless and
wireline Internet access services." 59
For its part, the FCC made no attempt to more sufficiently answer whether
or not wireless is a substitute for wireline. The Fifteenth Report offered no
assessment or new insights when it comes to the substitutability and
competitive impact of wireless in the broadband services market. Its subsection
on intermodal competition in voice services does not provide analysis,
conclusions, or substantive insights regarding competitive pressures in the
voice services market resulting from wireless and cross-platform competition.
If the FCC is correct that alone, the numbers cited in the Fifteenth Report do
not establish substitutability, it should more rigorously examine the issue,
perhaps with its own study and evaluation. An agency adhering to a forward-
looking perspective, one that takes seriously the dynamism of today's
advanced telecommunications marketplace, should answer these questions in
the affirmative. The FCC's apparent lack of interest in pursuing these answers,
however, is again consistent with the pro-regulatory perspective that the
agency brings to questions regarding effective competition.
"' Id. at 4-5, 15; FCC's Wireless Competition Report Should Take Wireless Substitution
Seriously, THE FREE STATE FOUND. (May 11, 2011), http://commcns.org/tl ioJJ.
158 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 367 (citing Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, T 342;
FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 42-44 (2010); In re
Economic Issues in Broadband Competition; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Ex
Parte Submission of the United States Department of Justice, GN Docket No. 09-51, at 8,
10, 11 (Jan. 4, 2010)).
i5 Id. (citing FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 42-44
(2010); In re Economic Issues in Broadband Competition; A National Broadband Plan for
Our Future, Ex Parte Submission of the United States Department of Justice, GN Docket
No. 09-51, at 8, 10, 11 (Jan. 4, 2010)).
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As a result, the hands-off approach to intermodal competition issues has
decidedly pro-regulatory effects. For example, the continued enforcement of
many Title II legacy wireline regulations against incumbent local exchange
providers ("ILECs") depends on the FCC's continuing policy of refusing to
consider the impact of wireless substitution. Wireline telecommunications
providers are, in many instances, still subject to legacy regulatory burdens
premised on monopoly-era assumptions about competition in the market.
Arguably, those assumptions are already unwarranted in light of voice
competition from cable and other wireline competitors. Those assumptions
appear to be particularly unwarranted when one considers the additional
choices offered by facilities-based wireless providers and MVNOs.
Interestingly, within the existing subsidy system, the FCC appears to
acknowledge the reality and impact of wireless-wireline competition. Recently,
it issued an order imposing certain near-term universal service reforms for its
Lifeline and Link-Up program in which it noted that "[t]he
telecommunications marketplace has changed significantly over the last fifteen
years, with a wide array of wireline and wireless services that compete with
traditional incumbent telephone companies."1 60 Similarly, the FCC has
recognized that one of the "four fundamental problems" with the intercarrier
compensation system is that "technological advances, including the rise of new
modes of communications such as texting, e-mail, and wireless substitution
have caused local exchange carriers' compensable minutes to decline, resulting
in additional pressures on the system and uncertainty for carriers."l61
Nevertheless, the FCC has not internalized that competition when it comes
to the legacy regulatory system it oversees.162 Take for example the Section
160 In re Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization; Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service; Lifeline and Link Up, Report and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 9022, 4 (June 21,
2011).
161 In re Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future; Establishing
Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal Service
Support; Developing an Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime; Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service; Lifeline and Link-Up, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 4554, T 495 (Feb. 8, 2011). See also
In re Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future; Establishing Just
and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal Service Support;
Developing an Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime; Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service; Lifeline and Link-Up; Universal Service Reform - Mobility Fund,
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 10-90, GN
Docket No. 09-51, WC Docket No. 07-135, WC Docket No. 05-337, CC Docket No. 01-92,
CC Docket No. 96-45, WC Docket No. 03-109, WT Docket No. 10-208, 1 9 (Nov. 18,
2011) (concluding that the intercarrier compensation system is "eroding rapidly as
consumers increasingly shift from traditional telephone service to substitutes including
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), wireless, texting, and email.").
162 In re Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization; Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service; Lifeline and Link Up, Report and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 9022, T 4 (June 21,
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251(c)(3) unbundled network element ("UNE") rules that were recently at
issue in the Qwest Phoenix MSA Order.163 Contrary to its pronouncement in
the Lifeline and Link-Up order, the FCC rejected Qwest's forbearance petition
for regulatory relief by insisting there was "nothing in the record to indicate
that, in the years since the passage of the 1996 Act, these barriers have been
lowered for competitive LECs that do not already have an extensive local
network used to provide other services today." 16 In reaching this result, the
Order refused to consider wireless voice services as a substitute for wireline
voice services. Instead, the FCC insisted that "[k]nowing the percentage of
households that rely exclusively upon mobile wireless is insufficient to
determine whether mobile wireless services have a price-constraining effect on
. . ,165
wireline access services.
However, there is good reason to conclude that the FCC's demand for
evidence of price-constraining effects is misguided in this context. As an initial
matter, the abundance of wireless voice and data service plans make a
comparison difficult, particularly since many of those services are offered as
part of bundled packages. The wide variety of wireless price options, including
all-you-can-eat plans, bucket plans, and prepaid plans, also renders analysis of
price-constraining effects of wireless on wireline an undertaking that is
difficult, and possibly impossible, in today's voice and data market.
Furthermore, the FCC's reliance on price-constraining effects in the
forbearance market power analysis in the Order has been criticized because it
fails to account for the basics of telecommunications economics. George S.
Ford and Lawrence J. Spiwack maintain that:
The production of telecommunications services requires large (and often sunk) capital
expenditures, and these fixed costs render declining average costs (i.e., scale
economies), or what is often called "increasing returns" (which is acknowledged in
the Phoenix Order). With increasing returns, average cost, and possibly marginal cost,
is falling as output expands. As a result, average cost exceeds marginal costs so that a
price equal to short-run marginal cost fails to generate sufficient revenue to cover total
cost, so the firm faces financial losses. This fact is well established in literature of
telecommunications regulation.166
As a result, Ford and Spiwack conclude that evidence of marginal cost
pricing "will never be present, since marginal cost pricing is not feasible in
almost all telecommunications markets given the prevalence of fixed and sunk
2011).
163 In re Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in
the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25
F.C.C.R. 8622 (June 15, 2010).
'MId. T 84.
165 Id. T 58-59.
166 George S. Ford and Lawrence J. Spiwack, The Impossible Dream: Forbearance After
the Phoenix Order, PHOENIX CTR. FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POLICY STUDIES, at
3 (Dec. 16, 2010).
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costs."l67 By refusing to consider intermodal competition, in both the Qwest
Phoenix MSA Order and the Fifteenth Report, because of the lack of evidence
pointing to wireless' price-constraining effects, the FCC may be imposing an
unreasonable standard by setting up a pro-regulatory standard that is difficult
to overcome.
All this is in spite of the fact that the 1993 Act and the 1996 Act were
adopted with a pro-competition and deregulatory emphasis. The forbearance
authority delegated to the FCC in Section 332(c) and Section 10, as well as the
FCC's regulatory review process under Section 11, are key deregulatory tools
designed to further a free market approach.168 The existence of wireless-
wireline competition therefore should have important deregulatory policy
implications regarding legacy wireline regulation under Section 10 and
wireless under Section 332. However, by declining to factor wireless-wireline
competition into its marketplace competition assessments, the FCC is
prolonging the regulatory status quo. Furthermore, the Fifteenth Report, would
have provided an opportune moment for the Commission to assess intermodal
competition and wireless substitutability for voice services in light of the rising
number of wireless-only and "cut the cord" households. By issuing a Report
devoid of such analysis, the FCC prolongs the life of increasingly
anachronistic legacy wireline regulation.
One can only hope that a future Sixteenth Report will undertake more
serious intermodal competition analysis that will guide the FCC's regulatory
policies regarding wireless and wireline.169 At a minimum, the FCC could
examine the effects of such competition for voice services. Regulations should
be reduced or eliminated where premised on monopoly conditions that no
longer exist, allowing new and potential competitive market conditions to
flourish and competitors to deliver goods and services to consumers.
V. AT&T/T-MOBILE MERGER AND ITS IMPACT ON FUTURE FCC
WIRELESS REGULATORY POLICY
While the Fifteenth Report does not take into account the proposed
AT&T/T-Mobile merger, the deal has the potential to alter the landscape of the
wireless marketplace by the time of a prospective Sixteenth Report. And
should the FCC seek to further a pro-regulatory course in wireless policy, the
merger could factor into the agency's rationale behind future regulatory
endeavors. Therefore, this Section includes a short discussion of how the U.S.
167 Id. at 5.
16847 U.S.C. § 332(c) (2006); 47 U.S.C. §160 (2006); 47 U.S.C § 161 (2006).
169 See Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on the State of Mobile
Wireless Competition, Public Notice, DA 11-1856, WT Docket No. I1-186 (Nov. 3, 2011).
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Department of Justice's antitrust lawsuit might impact the FCC's review of the
merger and how the litigation might affect FCC wireless regulatory policy.
Curiously, DOJ's analytical approach to wireless competition appears beset by
shortcomings similar to those contained in recent FCC reports. Accordingly,
drawing on insights about the wireless market reflected in the FCC's wireless
competition reports, as well as analysis developed in Section III, this section
concludes with a brief critique of the reasoning contained in the complaint
filed in U.S. v. AT&T.
A. Background
On March 20, 2011, AT&T Inc. announced its plans to acquire T-Mobile
USA, Inc., a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG.170 Under the terms of the
deal, AT&T agreed to acquire from Deutsche Telekom all of T-Mobile's stock
for $39 billion in total consideration. The merged entity would service
approximately 132 million customer connections to mobile wireless devices by
combining AT&T's approximately 98.6 million connections with T-Mobile's
approximately 33.6 million connections.172
1. FCC Merger Review ofAT& T/T-Mobile
A month after public announcement of the proposed merger, AT&T and T-
Mobile filed their public interest statement and applications seeking the FCC's
consent to the transfer of control of T-mobiles spectrum licenses to AT&T. 73
On April 28, the FCC established a pleading cycle for public comments on the
proposed merger and commenced its 180-day informal shot clock for
reviewing the proposed merger and license transfer applications.174
At the time its review process for AT&T/T-Mobile began, the FCC already
was reviewing a proposed transfer of spectrum licenses from Qualcomm Inc.
to AT&T Mobility Spectrum LLC, arising out of a sale in which AT&T agreed
to purchase the rights to spectrum in the Lower 700 MHz frequency band for
170 See Press Release, AT&T to Acquire T-Mobile USA From Deutsche Telekom (Mar.
20, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/udt001.
'1 See ACQUISITION OF T-MOBILE USA, INC. BY AT&T INC.: DESCRIPTION OF
TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS 9, 16-17 (Apr.
21, 2011).
172 See Complaint N 10, U.S. v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:1I-cv-01560 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2011).
Id. 2.
See generally ACQUISITION OF T-MOBILE USA, INC. BY AT&T INC.: DESCRIPTION OF
TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS (Apr. 21, 2011).
174 See In re AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG Seek FCC Consent to the Transfer of
Control of the Licenses and Authorizations Held by T-Mobile USA, Inc. and Its
Subsidiaries to AT&T Inc., Pleading Cycle Established, 26 F.C.C.R. 6424 (Apr. 28, 2011).
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$1.925 billion.175 On August 8, the FCC determined that both proposed
transactions "raise a number of related issues, including, but not limited to,
questions regarding AT&T's aggregation of spectrum throughout the nation,
particularly in overlapping areas."1 76 The FCC concluded that it would
"consider them in a coordinated manner at this time, without prejudice to
independent treatment at a later date."l 77 On August 26, the FCC restarted the
merger clock, making December 1 the 180th day of its review.
On November 22, Chairman Genachowski circulated an order approving
AT&T's purchase of spectrum licenses from Qualcomm.179 On the same day,
the Chairman circulated a separate order on AT&T/T-Mobile calling for a
review hearing in front of an administrative law judge ("AL").180
If the circulated order to send AT&T/T-Mobile to an AU had received the
concurrence of two additional Commissioners, the AU would have considered
any factual issues raised by the FCC relating to its public interest inquiry. s8
However, AT&T promptly withdrew their applications at the FCC, apparently
before any vote was taken on the circulated order.182 The withdrawal, accepted
by the FCC on November 29, will allow AT&T and T-Mobile to focus on their
lawsuit against DOJ and then, if they win the lawsuit, reapply for FCC
approval on better footing. 183 Despite the dismissal of AT&T and T-Mobile's
175 See Press Release, AT&T Agrees to Acquire Wireless Spectrum from Qualcomm
(Dec. 20, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/vdqeRG; In re AT&T Mobility Spectrum
LLC and Qualcomm Incorporated Seek FCC Consent to the Assignment of Lower 700 MHz
Band Licenses, Pleading Cycle Established, 26 F.C.C.R. 1336 (Feb. 9, 2011).
Letter from Rick Kaplan, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, to Michael P.
Goggin, AT&T Mobility Spectrum LLC, and Dean Brenner, QUALCOMM Incorporated,
Re: Applications of AT&T Mobility Spectrum LLC and QUALCOMM Incorporated for
Consent To Assign Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses (WT Docket No. 1 1-18) (Aug. 8, 2011),
available at http://commcns.org/uGEwon.
77 id.
178 See Letter from Rick Kaplan, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, to Richard
L. Rosen, Counsel for AT&T, Inc., Re: Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom
AG for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of License and Authorizations (WT Docket
No. 11-65) (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/sOplDB.
179 See, e.g., Amy Schatz, AT&T Faces New Hurdle, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://commcns.org/vibJCi.
"s See id.
"8 See id.182 See Letter from Patrick J. Grant, Counsel for AT&T, Inc., and Nancy J. Victory,
Counsel for Deutsche Telekom AG, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission, Re: Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG
for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of License and Authorizations (WT Docket No.
11-65) (Nov. 23, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/tYotAa; Statement from Wayne
Watts, AT&T Senior Executive VP and General Counsel (Nov. 24, 2011),
http://commcns.org/uHdPMO.
1 See In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to
Assign or Transfer Control of License and Authorizations, Order, WT Docket No. 11-65, S
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applications without prejudice,184 the Commission released a staff analysis and
findings that AT&T/T-Mobile was not in the public interest and "would likely
lead to a substantial lessening of competition in violation of the Clayton
Act." 85 This staff analysis formed the basis of the Chairman's circulated order
regarding AT&T/T-Mobile.186
2. United States v. AT&T and Sprint v. AT&T
Following the announcement of AT&T/T-Mobile, DOJ undertook its own
review of the merger pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. However, on
August 31 DOJ filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, requesting that the court block the merger because its effect "likely
will be to lessen competition substantially in interstate trade and commerce in
the relevant geographic markets for mobile wireless telecommunications
services, and enterprise and government mobile wireless telecommunications
services, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act." 88
Wireless rival Sprint filed a separate complaint in the same court on
September 6, likewise seeking to block the merger's completion due to an
alleged violation of the Clayton Act.189 On September 16, seven states -
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Washington - joined DOJ's lawsuit.190 The same month, another competing
wireless provider, Cellular South, joined DOJ's lawsuit by filing its own
complaint. 191
U.S. District Court Judge Ellen S. Huvelle set a February 13 trial date for
7 (Nov. 29, 2011), http://commcns.org/us5GkL. See also Cecilia Kang, FCC to Accept
Withdrawal of AT&T, T-Mobile Merger, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://commcns.org/tsPK3z.
See In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to
Assign or Transfer Control of License and Authorizations, Order, WT Docket No. 11-65,
10Nov. 29, 2011), http://commcns.org/us5GkL.
i 5 See In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to
Assign or Transfer Control of License and Authorizations, Staff Analysis and Findings, WT
Docket No. 11-65, 5 (Nov. 29, 2011), http://commcns.org/taErj l; Cecilia Kang, FCC
Report Challenges AT&T's Claims on T-Mobile Deal, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://commcns.org/rP5vPl.
8 See In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to
Assign or Transfer Control of License and Authorizations, Order, WT Docket No. 11-65,
2 (Nov. 29, 2011), http://commcns.org/us5GkL.
187 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2006).
88 Complaint 47, U.S. v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11 -cv-01560 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2011).
89 See Complaint at 11, 18, Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01600
(D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2011).
190 See Complaint at 15, Cellular South, Inc. v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01690 (D.D.C.
Se t. 19, 2011).
F91 See id 1 19.
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U.S. v. AT&T.192 While Judge Huvelle "does not anticipate consolidating the
pending suits against AT&T," 93 some press reports and analysts have
discussed the possibility of AT&T negotiating a settlement with DOJ, perhaps
by divesting assets that were part of the proposed merger deal. 194 Moreover,
some reports speculate that AT&T will be particularly aggressive in pursuing a
settlement with DOJ because the proposed merger includes an agreement that
AT&T must give T-Mobile billions in consideration if the deal is blocked.'95
Nonetheless, on November 8, Attorney General Eric Holder stated before a
Senate Judiciary Committee panel on antitrust issues that DOJ has a trial team
that is "ready and eager to go to court."' 96
In a November 2 ruling on AT&T's motion to dismiss claims brought by
Sprint and Cellular South, Judge Huvelle dismissed several of the plaintiff
carriers' claims for failure to establish an antitrust injury sufficient to given
them standing.197 In particular, Judge Huvelle, dismissed the competing
carriers' claims that the proposed merger would result in an illegal
concentration of market power in the retail wireless services market and lead to
higher monthly fees that consumers pay for postpaid wireless services and
higher bulk fees for corporate and government entities.198 Among other claims
dismissed by Judge Huvelle were Sprint's antitrust claims regarding the market
for backhaul services, Sprint's antitrust claims regarding the market for
wireless spectrum and network development, and both competing carriers'
claims regarding the market for roaming-although Cellular South's roaming
claims remain with respect to the three percent of its network that uses Global
System for Mobile Communications ("GSM") as its transmission protocol. 99
Judge Huvelle also denied AT&T's motion to dismiss the competing carriers
"merger to monopsony" antitrust claims that, post-merger, increased market
concentration would give AT&T and Verizon market power sufficient to
192 See, e.g., Mike Scarcella, DOJ v. AT&T Antitrust Suit Set for February Trial, THE
BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), http://commens.org/uaE63K.
193 See, e.g., id.
194 See, e.g., Nadia Damouni and Diane Bartz, AT&T Prepares Two-Track Plan to Save
T-Mobile Deal, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2011), http://commcns.org/ubjrad.
195 Juliana Gruenwald, Justice Department Gives AT&TMerger Plan Zero Bars, NAT'LJ.
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://commcns.org/sKTiym ("The firm has reportedly promised to give T-
Mobile USA parent Deutsche Telekom $3 billion in cash, $2 billion worth of spectrum, plus
roaming privileges valued at $1 billion if the deal is blocked.").
196 Thomas Catan, Holder Says Justice Is 'Eager' For Trial In AT&T Case, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://commcns.org/s6Vci0.
See Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T, Inc., No. 1:11 -cv-0 1600, Cellular South, Inc. v.
AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01690 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2011) (order denying motions to dismiss
lawsuit).
'9' Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 27-30, 33-38, 39-42.
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coerce exclusionary deals with wireless handset manufacturers. 200
While Judge Huvelle's ruling significantly narrowed the scope of the
competing carriers' legal challenge to the proposed merger, because the ruling
was based on antitrust standing and not the merits, the ruling will have no
impact on DOJ's claims. As Judge Huvelle explained, "established precedent
forecloses competitors' claims that challenge a proposed transaction's effect on
competition without sufficiently alleging the threat of an injury-in-fact that
they face and that is 'of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent' . .
. [s]uch claims belong to the government." 201
B. Impact of U.S. v. AT&T on FCC's Re-review of AT&T/T-Mobile Merger
Significantly, the last merger to be delegated to an ALJ was the proposed
EchoStar/DirecTV merger, which likewise was accompanied by an FCC
finding that the merging parties did not meet their burden of proving that the
merger was in the public interest.202 This action also resulted in the prompt
203
withdrawal of the proposed merger by the parties. However, AT&T and T-
Mobile's withdrawal at the FCC further heightens the significance of U.S. v.
AT&T, as the merging parties appear to be counting on courtroom vindication
or a settlement with DOJ to have favorable implications for an eventual
renewed FCC review of the merger.
Of course, even if AT&T and T-Mobile succeed at trial, the FCC could
repeat the staff analysis and findings it released on November 29 and vote to
designate the proposed merger for an ALJ hearing. In fact, the release of the
staff analysis and findings could reasonably be viewed as the agency's attempt
to influence the outcome of U.S. v. AT&T. Regardless, an FCC order placing
the merger before an ALJ would add an additional and likely painstaking
procedural layer to the merger review process, with any eventual ALJ ruling
subject to appeal before the full Commission. Conversely, a trial verdict and
findings of fact made in favor of AT&T and T-Mobile could undermine the
factual and analytical bases for another FCC designation order for an ALJ
200 Id. at 15-26.
201 Id. at 43 (citations omitted). Regardless of the legal merits of Sprint and Cellular
South's remaining legal claims, the litigation could shed additional light on handset
exclusivity and other arrangements between wireless carriers and handset manufacturers.
For instance, the FCC could factor information arising out of Sprint v. AT&T in the course
of future wireless policymaking touching on wireless handsets, including exclusivity
arrangements or early termination fees.
202 See In re Application of EchoStar Communications et al., Hearing Designation Order,
17 F.C.C.R. 20559, 3 (Oct. 18, 2002).
203 See Amy Schatz, AT&T Faces New Hurdle, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://commcns.org/vibJCi.
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hearing. Instead, this could make FCC approval of the deal upon reapplication
more likely.
Even if AT&T and T-Mobile are successful in fending off legal challenges
to their proposed merger, the Commission already has signaled its disfavor
toward the deal through the Chairman's circulated order and the released staff
analysis.204 Thus, it appears likely that the FCC will seek to impose
considerable conditions on any prospective approval of AT&T/T-Mobile. Even
DOJ-imposed conditions for settlement would probably constitute a floor, with
the FCC assuming discretion to establish the ceiling by attaching additional
regulatory conditions to its approval of the merger.
It also is possible that the types of conditions the FCC will place on the
proposed AT&T/T-Mobile merger will be novel to wireless services. Since
wireless services have not been subject to the same regulatory burdens as other
technologies, such as wireline telecommunications, the FCC's review presents
the possibility of at least one major wireless services becoming subject to new
regulatory burdens.
Under the relevant sections of the Communications Act,205 the FCC review
of proposed telecommunications and media mergers includes a determination
of whether the proposed transfer of licenses "will serve the public interest,
convenience, and necessity." 206 The FCC maintains that it has authority "to
impose and enforce narrowly tailored, transaction-specific conditions to ensure
that the public interest is served." 207 On this basis the FCC has approved
several major mergers and other transactions subject to a host of conditions.208
Criticisms of the FCC's merger review process have been raised in recent
years, along with calls for reform. Critics have charged that the FCC has
imposed conditions unrelated to any specific anticompetitive harms arising
from the merger.209 And thus it appears that the agency has used the merger to
204 See Cecilia Kang, AT&T CEO's Surprise Call from FCC Chairman, WASH. POST
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://commcns.org/ruXa96; In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and
Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of License and
Authorizations, Staff Analysis and Findings, WT Docket No. 11-65 (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://commcns.org/taErj 1.
o0 See 47 U.S.C. 214(a), 310(d). See also In re Applications Filed by Qwest
Communications International Inc. and CenturyTel, Inc. d/b/a CenturyLink for Consent to
Transfer Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 4194, 7 n.26 (Mar. 18,
2011) (noting that Section 310(d) requires the FCC to "consider applications for transfer of
Title III licenses under the same standard as if the proposed transferee were applying for
licenses directly under section 308.").
206 In re Applications Filed by Qwest Communications International Inc. and CenturyTel,
Inc. d/b/a CenturyLink for Consent to Transfer Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
26 F.C.C.R. 4194, 7 (Mar. 18, 2011).
207 Id. T 10.
208 See, e.g., id. at 4218-19.
209 See, e.g., Commissioner Meredith Atwell Baker, Remarks at the IPI Third Annual
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test-balloon novel regulatory policies as merger conditions as a prelude to
future industry-wide regulation.
In the AT&T/BellSouth Merger Review Order, for instance, the FCC
imposed a network neutrality condition on its approval of the merger long
before the FCC imposed network neutrality regulations on all broadband and
wireless broadband ISPs.210 Additionally, in the Comcast-NBCU Merger
Review Order, the FCC conditioned its approval on Comcast-NBCU adhering
to the agency's network neutrality regulations adopted in its Open Internet
Order, "and, in the event of any judicial challenge affecting the latter,
Comcast-NBCU's voluntary commitments concerning adherence to those rules
will be in effect." 211 While the FCC has at other times shown restraint in
merger reviews, such as its rejection of handset exclusivity conditions in
approving AT&T/Centennial,212 AT&T/T-Mobile could become an occasion
for the FCC to impose handset exclusivity conditions, ETF conditions, bill
shock conditions, or any other number of novel regulatory conditions involving
wireless services. The FCC could also condition approval on AT&T's
commitment to adhere to the agency's recently adopted network neutrality
regulations or its data roaming rules, regardless of any alternation to those
industry-wide requirements through judicial challenges.
Additional criticisms have been leveled against the FCC for imposing
conditions on its approval of mergers that are more fit for industry-wide
rulemakings, as well as imposing conditions it would otherwise lack the power
to impose as an industry-wide rulemaking.213 In this regard, a jobs-related
condition might be included as a stipulation for the FCC's approval of
AT&T/T-Mobile. The companies have pledged to locate call center jobs in
214
various locations if the proposed merger is approved, and the FCC staff
Communications Summit: Towards a More Targeted and Predictable Merger Review
Process (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/w50TQ2; Randolph J. May, A
Modest Plea for FCC Modesty Regarding the Public Interest Standard, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
895, 904 (2008).
210 In re AT&T and Bell South Application for Transfer of Control, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5814, 5831 (Dec. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Bell South
Order]; Open Internet Order, supra note 146, 1, 49-50.
211 In re Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc.; For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 4238, 94 (Jan. 20, 2011).
212 In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Centennial Communications Corp.; For Consent
to Transfer Control of Licenses, Authorizations, and Spectrum Leasing Arrangements,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C.R. 13915, TT 139, 141 (Nov. 5, 2009); Seth L.
Cooper, FCC Keeps Its Hands Off Handset Exclusivity, For Now..., THE FREE STATE
FOUND. (Nov. 9, 2009), http://commcns.org/sgo7de.
213 Phillip J. Weiser, FCC Reform and the Future of Telecommunications Policy, at 23-26
(Jan. 5, 2009), available at http://commcns.org/tlSkBo.
214 Matt Egan, AT&T Pledges to Return 5K Jobs if T-Mobile Deal is Approved, FOX Bus.
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analysis and findings on AT&T/T-Mobile indicated a willingness to consider
job creation as part of the agency's public interest standard.215 The FCC's
AT&T/BellSouth Merger Review Order, for instance, provides precedent for
the agency imposing a jobs repatriation condition for merger approval.216
Moreover, a recent statement by one DOJ official noted that AT&T/T-Mobile
would result in a loss of jobs-despite the fact that DOJ's complaint does not
mention anything about jobs.217
C. Impact of AT&T/T-Mobile Merger on FCC Wireless Policy
An FCC order regarding re-filed applications by AT&T and T-Mobile could
indirectly impact FCC wireless regulatory policy. To the extent that future
agency policy focuses on static market share and HHI estimates of market
concentration, increased mobile wireless HHI scores resulting from AT&T/T-
Mobile may provide the FCC with the rationale to pull "policy levers" and
enact any number of industry-wide wireless-related regulatory initiatives,
including those mentioned above.
The FCC's order approving Harbinger/SkyTerra evidences the FCC's
willingness to impose merger conditions on non-parties to the transaction.
Post-merger, larger providers could find themselves subject to additional
restrictions of that kind in future merger reviews involving smaller providers.
More likely, however, the FCC may take wireless provider spectrum holdings
into account when conducting future spectrum auctions by applying an "HHI
screen" that will restrict the ability of major carriers to acquire new spectrum
in some way. Furthermore, the FCC could encumber newly auctioned
spectrum with "open access" conditions, or with other mandates to be imposed
on all or just the largest wireless providers.
D. A Brief Critique of DOJ's Complaint in U.S. v. AT&T
Without taking sides on U.S. v. AT&T or pre-judging the merits of DOJ's
case, a reading of DOJ's complaint reveals at least a few significant
(Ag. 31, 2011), http://commcns.org/tZjoMh.In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to Assign or
Transfer Control of License and Authorizations, Staff Analysis and Findings, WT Docket
No. 1-65, 259-266 (Nov. 29, 2011), http://commcns.org/taErj1.
216 Bell South Order, supra note 210, at 5807.217 Edward Wyatt, U.S. Moves to Block Merger Between AT&T and T-Mobile, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011), http://commcns.org/sYYmAK; Hance Haney, Blocking AT&T + T-
Mobile Merger Will Not Create Jobs, DISCOVERY INST. (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://commcns.org/tRDK5A.
s See Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, T 48 n. 121.
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shortcomings in its initial attempt to show that AT&T/T-Mobile would
substantially harm innovation, investment and competition in the wireless
market. The common thread between those shortcomings is the primarily static
market approach to wireless services suggested by DOJ. Those shortcomings
are also reflective of the FCC's approach to wireless competition discussed
above. But in reality, as market data contained in the Fifteenth Report
indicates, 219 wireless is one of our nation's most dynamic markets,
characterized by innovation, variety of service and product choices, and
competitive price options. Aside from whether AT&T/T-Mobile would likely
lessen competition or result in consumer harm, DOJ should only prevail if it
can present evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrating the merger's
likely anticompetitive effects in a way that factors in forward-looking
considerations about the wireless and the advanced telecommunications
market.
1. DOJ's Complaint Over-Emphasizes Market Concentration and
Downplays Dynamism
DOJ's static outlook includes an over-emphasis on HHI numbers about
market concentration. By DOJ's estimates, post-merger, 96 of the largest 100
Competitive Market Areas (CMA) will have HHI scores exceeding 2,500.220
And in 91 CMAs the merger "would increase the HHI by more than 200
points. Such an increase is presumed to be likely to enhance market power." 221
Additionally, in at least 15 of the CMAs "the combined firm would have a
greater than 50 percent share - i.e., more customers than all other firms
combined." DOJ further premises its antitrust claims on HHIl estimates for the
nationwide market, asserting that "the proposed merger would result in an HHI
of more than 3,100 for mobile wireless telecommunications services, an
increase of nearly 700 points . . . substantially exceed[ing] the thresholds at
which mergers are presumed to be likely to enhance market power."222
It is worth observing that DOJ's HHIl estimates contain some notable
limitations. First, as the FCC acknowledges in its Fifteenth Report,
"[c]alculating the HHIl at the level of a CMA .. . would generally result in an
219 See discussion, supra Part Ill.
220 Complaint 22, U.S. v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:1 1-cv-01560 (D.C.C. Aug. 31, 2011).
221 Id. 23.
222 Id. 25. DOJ likewise argues that national market for mobile wireless telecom
services provided to enterprise and government customers, AT&T/T-Mobile "would result
in an HHI of at least 3,400, an increase of at least 300 points," which similarly "exceed[s]
the thresholds at which mergers are presumed to be likely to enhance market power." Id.
26.
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average market HHI that is higher than for one based on EAs."223 Moreover,
nationwide HHI numbers do not reflect the reality of competing alternatives
available to real consumers. As the FCC pointed out in its Fourteenth Report:
Because mobile wireless consumers are generally not willing to search for
competitive alternatives that do not serve their local areas, the relevant geographic
area is a local area. Accordingly, assessing competition in mobile wireless services at
the national level could overstate the level of competition and industry concentration
because the total number of providers in the entire United States exceeds the number
of providers that compete with each other in any single region in which a consumer
searches for a wireless provider. 224
The DOJ's complaint also fails to note that its HHI estimates include
consumer welfare-enhancing benefits brought about by the prepaid wireless
resale market. While the FCC admittedly skips over the prepaid wireless resale
market in its own HHI estimates, it acknowledges that "HHIs and other market
concentration metrics that use subscriber connections or sales of facilities-
based providers only may not fully reflect the effect of [prepaid wireless
resellers] on competition and consumer welfare." 225
Most importantly, HHI does not by itself indicate whether markets, in
particular dynamic markets, are ultimately competitive. As Professor Dennis L.
Weisman has articulated,
it is widely recognized in the economics literature that dynamic efficiency (the
introduction of innovative new services and production methods) is more important
than static efficiency (the alignment of prices with economic costs) in terms of
conferring benefits on consumers. This is particularly likely to be the case in
technologically dynamic industries, such as telecommunications.226
The FCC explained in its Fifteenth Report that "[s]hares of subscribers and
measures of concentration are not synonymous with a non-competitive market
or with market power . . . High market concentration may indicate that a firm
or firms potentially may be able to exercise market power, but market
concentration measures alone are insufficient to draw such a conclusion. 227
Instead, factors such as "entry and exit conditions, the degree of price and non-
price rivalry, innovation, and the influence of the upstream and downstream
markets" may influence the degree of competition in the mobile wireless
services market.228 Therefore, what matters in dynamic markets is not a
particular snapshot of market share, but whether overall market conditions are
223 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, T 50. Economic Areas or "EAs" are "geographic units
defined by the U.S. Department of Commerce that define geographic economic markets
usin data on commuting patterns." See id. 25 n.44.
22 Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, 1 24.22 5 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 49.
226 Dennis L. Weisman, On Market Power and the Power of Markets: A Schumpeterian
View ofDynamic Industries, THE FREE STATE FOUND., at 2 (Feb. 26, 2008).227 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, T 54.
228 id
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conducive to the continued innovation and competition that brings about new
and disruptive services.
2. DOJ's Complaint Dismisses Substitutability in a Technologically
Converging Market
DOJ's static outlook also is embodied in its dismissal of potential substitutes
for intermodal competition, despite the broad advanced telecommunications
market characterized by convergence in voice, video, and data services. The
complaint argues that the lack of mobility offered by fixed wireless and
wireline service makes them, in the mind of consumers, unsuitable alternatives
to mobile wireless service.229 Moreover, the complaint notes that even with a
significant price increase "by a hypothetical monopolist it is unlikely that a
sufficient number of customers would switch some or all of their usage from
mobile wireless telecommunications services to fixed wireless or wireline
services such that the price increase or reduction in innovation would be
unprofitable." 230
However, there is good reason to conclude that DOJ's "hypothetical
monopolist" argument goes too far in denying that a sufficient number of
consumers would switch at least some of their voice or data usage in the face
of significant price increases. DOJ's formalistic rejection of wireless-wireline
substitution is at odds with the convergence actually taking place in today's
advanced telecommunications market. As explained earlier, wireless and
wireline platform both offer voice and data services.231 The 25%-plus-and-
growing wireless-only households recognized by the FCC in its Fifteenth
Report constitute obvious and unmistakable evidence that consumers have, in
many cases, substituted wireless for wireline.232
The special benefits of mobility also are tempered by bandwidth and other
technological limitations equally unique to mobile wireless services. As the
FCC has acknowledged, "existing mobile networks present operational
constraints that fixed broadband networks do not typically encounter," such as
network speeds, capacity, and latency characteristics.233 Fixed broadband
networks generally offer faster speeds, greater capacity to carry high-definition
and other data-rich traffic, and lesser latency limits than mobile broadband.
Further, wireline capabilities are not limited to desktop PCs, as laptop
computers are able to plug into wireline networks at hotels or Wi-Fi hotspots.
229 Complaint 12-13, U.S. v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.C.C. Aug. 31, 2011).230 Id 12.
231 See discussion, supra Part IV.B.
232 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, 1 365.233 See Open Internet Order, supra note 146, 95.
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Moreover, emerging technologies such as femtocells offer consumers fixed
wireless capabilities that rely principally on wireline connections, but offer
many of the benefits of mobile wireless. Consequently, there are service and
price trade-offs for consumers to weigh when considering wireline versus
wireless usage.
Certain aspects of today's advanced telecommunications market decrease
the likelihood of unearthing any conclusive set of evidence regarding wireless-
wireline substitution. In its Fourteenth Report, the FCC described the difficulty
of generating numerical estimates of price mark-up over cost "due to the
complexities of estimating market power in an industry with high fixed costs
that are recovered gradually over time, difficulties with analyzing pricing plans
for bundles of services, and the difficulties in obtaining accurate and suitable
cost data."234 In other words, the abundance of wireless voice and data service
plans makes intermodal comparison difficult, particularly since many of those
services are offered as part of bundled packages. Given the dynamism of
today's advanced telecommunications market, DOJ's apparent refusal to
consider intermodal competition suggests an unreasonable and pro-regulatory
standard. DOJ's demands for demonstrable evidence of price-constraining
effects of intermodal competition likely fail to take into account the basics of
telecommunications economics, as explained by Ford and Spiwack.m
3. DOJ's Complaint Essentially Ignores 4G, the Driver of Tomorrow's
Wireless Market
In its complaint, DOJ again adopts a static outlook regarding 4G wireless
network technologies. A forward-looking view of the wireless market would
put significant emphasis on the ongoing migration of competing wireless
networks to 4G standards. However, the DOJ's complaint takes a backward-
looking view, mentioning 4G only in its description of T-Mobile as "the first
company to roll out and market a nationwide network based on advanced
HSPA+ technology and marketed as 4G." 236 Emphasis is added on "marketed
as 4G" since, under the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
definition, only WiMAX 2 and LTE-advanced networks meet 4G standards.237
234 Fourteenth Report, supra note 16, 55.235 See discussion, supra Part IV.B.236 Complaint 29, U.S. v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.C.C. Aug. 31, 2011)
(emphasis added).
See Press Release, International Telecommunications Union, ITU World
Radiocommunication Seminar Highlights Future Communication Technologies (Dec. 6,
2010), available at http://commcns.org/vHC20h. See also Chris Ziegler, ITU Lays Down
Law: WiMAX 2, LTE-Advanced Aare 4G, Everyone Else Is a Buster, ENGADGET (Oct. 21,
2010), http://commcns.org/vvq7wX.
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While no American wireless carriers have yet deployed 4G networks that
operate at ITU-endorsed thresholds, the Fifteenth Report recognized that many
carriers have put themselves on the path to 4G through existing and near-term
LTE and WiMAX deployments. 23 8
While the Fifteenth Report acknowledges T-Mobile's HSPA+ deployment,
it is significant that it notes that T-Mobile has "[n]o U.S.-specific plans"
regarding LTE and WiMAX deployments.239 Kim Larsen, a senior executive at
Deutsche Telekom, ably described the importance of LTE is in a declaration
submitted to the FCC:
T-Mobile USA requires a clear path to LTE because LTE offers long-term spectrum
efficiencies over HSPA+. Given the burgeoning demand for mobile broadband data,
there is a need for greater spectrum bandwidths to meet the capacity and data speed
requirements. LTE is up to 40% more spectrally efficient than HSPA+ in larger
effective bandwidths, even with a dual carrier HSPA+ configuration. 240
As Larsen concludes, "[d]ue to spectrum exhaustion, difficulty in aggressive
re-farming of existing spectrum holdings and a lack of other viable spectrum
options, T-Mobile USA has no clear path to an effective, economical
deployment of LTE." 24 1 Similarly, Deutsche Telekom senior executive
Thorsten Langheim has declared that "[w]hile other competitors are quickly
moving to build out and develop their LTE networks, T-Mobile USA lacks a
clear path to deployment of LTE that is necessary for it to compete robustly in
the U.S." 242
Given their enhanced performance capabilities, 4G networks will
undoubtedly provide the backbone of future wireless innovation and growth.
One recent analyst report concluded that "[f]rom a technical standpoint, 4G
promises three benefits over 3G: increased throughput, lower latency, and
stronger security. One result is a reduced cost per megabit." 243 Furthermore, it
estimated that "U.S. investment in 4G networks could fall in the range of $25-
$53 billion during 2012-2016," and "could account for $73-$151 billion in
GDP growth and 371,000-771,000 new jobs."244
As a result, while DOJ countenances the competitive potential of T-Mobile
to overcome its "period of disappointing results" by focusing on "new
238 Fifteenth Report, supra note 2, at 9671 (3G/4G Deployment by Selected Mobile
Wireless Service Providers Table).
239 Id (3G/4G Deployment by Selected Mobile Wireless Service Providers Table).240 Declaration of Dr. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, WT Docket No. 11-65, DA 11-799, 27
(Apr. 19, 2011).
41 Id. T 23.
242 Declaration of Thorsten Langheim, WT Docket No. 11-65, DA 11-799, 11 (Apr. 19,
2011).
243 DELOITTE, THE IMPACT OF 4G TECHNOLOGY ON COMMERCIAL INTERACTIONS,
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS 9 (2011).
244 Id. at 7.
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aggressive and innovating pricing plans, low-priced smartphones, and superior
customer service,"2 it ignores the crucial 4G context in which future wireless
competition will be taking place. Similarly, DOJ's claim that the elimination of
T-Mobile as an independent competitor "likely will reduce the competitive
incentive to invest in wireless networks to attract and retain customers," 246
misses the next-generation context in which innovative wireless investment
will need to be directed to provide the platform for innovative new services.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fifieenth Report contains ample data showing, from an everyday
commonsense perspective, that today's wireless market is characterized by
"effective competitive." By failing to make any kind of effective competition
finding, the FCC fails to live up to its statutory requirements under Section
332(C). Additionally, the data regarding innovative and competitive service
and price offerings available to consumers renders the FCC's effective
competition agnosticism unjustifiable and only explainable in light of a pro-
regulatory perspective.
Unfortunately, the FCC's pro-regulatory approach also is evidenced by its
refusal in the Fifieenth Report to finally take intermodal competition seriously
despite the growing numbers of wireless-only households and cut-the-cord
customers. Both of the Report's analytical shortcomings point to the FCC's
unwillingness to fully recognize the dynamic nature of today's advanced
telecommunications market, in which rapid change and convergence break
down old technological barriers and cross-platform rivals seek to meet
consumer demands with new services and price options.
The Report does not itself impose or even propose any particular kind of
new regulation. However, the FCC characterizes the goal of its reports as
identifying where competitive outcomes may be improved through policy
levers and forming the basis of future inquiries into how those levers can be
pulled. Through the FCC's refusal to recognize the wireless marketplace as
"effectively competitive" and ignoring its intermodal competitive aspects, the
Report will likely serve as a source of agency authority in favor of prolonging
of certain outdated telecommunications regulation and for imposing future
regulations regarding wireless services that are unwarranted by competitive
market conditions. Moreover, given the FCC's pro-regulatory leanings, a
prospective AT&T/T-Mobile merger order may include onerous new
conditions might in turn lead to further industry-wide regulations.
245 Complaint T31, 36, U.S. v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.C.C. Aug. 31, 2011).
246 Id. T 39.
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